Winter 2007, Vol. XXIII, No. 1
Information and the Market for Union Representation
by Matthew T. Bodie
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In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
Information and the Market for Union Representation
by Matthew T. Bodie
View PDF
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
Information and the Market for Union Representation
by Matthew T. Bodie
View PDF
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
Information and the Market for Union Representation
by Matthew T. Bodie
View PDF
In its oversight of union representation elections, the National Labor Relations Board seeks to create “laboratory conditions” to determine “the uninhibited desires” of employees. Despite its comprehensive regulation of union and employer campaign conduct, the Board fails to insure that employees get basic information relating to their decision. This Article proposes a new paradigm for the representation decision: that of a purchase of representation services. This “purchase of services” model demonstrates that the market for union representation lacks the standard features required under economic theory to drive information into the marketplace. The resulting information deficiencies may render employees poorly equipped to make their representation decision.
